“From Arab Spring to Arab Winter” is the title of a special issue of the journal Democratization. Edited by Raymond Hinnebusch, an amazingly prolific international relations professor at the University of St. Andrews, it seeks to examine why democratization has largely failed in the wake of the prodemocratic uprisings, and what patterns can be elicited from the similarities and differences in outcomes from the many Arab Spring protests.
None of the articles focus exclusively on Egypt, but many refer to her in some detail, or make points especially relevant to Egypt’s situation.
This is very much Hinnebusch’s project: he offers an extraordinary synthetic model for looking at the post-uprising phases of the Arab Spring in his introduction, writes an essay comparing Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, and writes an extensive conclusion. Some of the authors are or were his students.
Here are the papers that touch on Egypt:
Hinnebusch, Raymond. 2015. Introduction: understanding the consequences of the Arab uprisings – starting points and divergent trajectories. Democratization 22(2): 205-217.
This introduction sets the context for the following articles by first conceptualizing the divergent post-uprising trajectories taken by varying states: these are distinguished first by whether state capacity collapses or persists, and if it persists, whether the outcome is a hybrid regime or polyarchy. It then assesses how far starting points – the features of the regime and of the uprising – explain these pathways. Specifically, the varying levels of anti-regime mobilization, explained by factors such as levels of grievances, patterns of cleavages, and opportunity structure, determine whether rulers are quickly removed or stalemate sets in. Additionally, the ability of regime and opposition softliners to reach a transition pact greatly shapes democratic prospects. But, also important is the capacity – coercive and co-optative – of the authoritarian rulers to resist, itself a function of factors such as the balance between the patrimonial and bureaucratic features of neo-patrimonial regimes.
The latest issue of the on-line journal Arab Media and Society, published by the Kamal Adham Center for Television and Digital Journalism at the American University in Cairo, has a slew of essays (five of six) on media in Egypt.
One is analytical–a look at international press coverage of Morsi’s ouster. The other four are essays offering bleak and bleaker outlooks on the future of Egyptian media.
The mildest is an account of the failure of Egypt to keep up with translation technology in the modern era. The bleakest sees all media in the Arab world as essentially under the control of the power and money elites–the digital dream is dead.
Here’s a quick round-up:
As more and more people get their news from digital media, including social media, many question the reliability of these new sources of news, as opposed to newspapers and television news. Are truth and verifiability disappearing from the news and, if so, does it matter?
I addressed this during a public lecture recently at the University of Cincinnati entitled “Toward an Anthropology of New Media.”
I suggested that there were at least five crucial problems facing scholarship on new media, and described what I saw as anthropology’s contributions to dealing with these problems.
During the Question and Answer period after the talk, an archaeology colleague asked me about whether one of the biggest problems with new media wasn’t the inability of news consumers to verify, and thus rely on, the news they read in their myriad on-line sources.
First, there is very little evidence that people ever verify the news. Rather, they tend to decide whether or not the news is true and reliable, based on
- Their relationship to the news source (whether the news is expressed in language they find reassuring, whether or not it is one they visit frequently, how long they have received their news from that source, etc.), and
- The degree to which the news agrees with what they already know (i.e. believe) to be true.
Long before the presidency of Muhammed Morsi, or the rise of Salafi parties following the uprisings, people in Egypt used to draw my attention to the “Islamization” of public life. The things that raised the most attention hit the news–the re-veiling of movies stars, for example, and the emergence of religious teachers such as Amr Khaled as media superstars.
But there were also changes in everyday language.
Older men and women in Egypt pointed out to me, for example, that there have been changes in such things as phone greetings and farewells over the past twenty years. People used to answer the phone with “’Alo” or “Na’am” (yes). By 2000 “Salaamu alaikum” (“Peace be with you”) had become common. Where people used to end conversations with “bye bye,” many now end with either “Salaamu alaikum wa akram Allah,” or, sometimes, with the two halves of the shahada.
The shahada, or declaration of the oneness of God, is a particularly interesting case. The utterance “La illaha ill Allah, wa Muhammad rasul Allah” (“There is no god but the God and Muhammad is his prophet”) is one of the central elements in Islam. It is the phrase uttered before witnesses when a convert submits to God and becomes a Muslim. As such, it is a performative utterance in Austin’s sense, a phrase that once spoken under the correct conditions, transforms one’s social (and in this case, spiritual) life forever.
But what does it mean when, at the end of a phone conversation, one person will say, “La illaha ill Allah” and the other respond “Wa Muhammad rasul Allah”?
Were the Egyptian uprisings a revolution or just regime change? Is there genuine transformation or has the deep state re-emerged fully intact and in charge?
The latest issue of the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies has a special issue on “Continuity and change before and after the Arab uprisings in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt.”
Arguing that few studies have looked at the North African protest movements in terms of the relationships between continuity and change, the authors in this special issue seek to amend this lacunae.
Six of the ten articles in this new issue refer, at least comparatively, with Egypt (while there are two articles that focus specifically on Morocco, and one on Tunisa, there are oddly no studies specifically focused on Egypt).
Here are the abstracts:
Rivetti, Paola. 2015. Continuity and Change before and after the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco: Regime Reconfiguration and Policymaking in North Africa. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 42(1): 1-11
While the scholarship on the Arab uprisings is increasingly complex and intellectually refined, this special issue considers an aspect that so far has failed to attract sustained scholarly attention, namely continuity and change. This introduction provides the framework underpinning the special issue as a whole and discusses all the articles composing it, while elaborating on the scientific contribution that the examination of continuity and change before and after the uprisings can make to our understanding of politics in the region.
The importance of media–both “traditional broadcast” and new media–in the Egyptian revolution and other revolutionary activities of the last four years is often framed as having refuted Gil Scott-Heron’s performance poem, “The Revolution Will Not Be Televised.”
But it doesn’t. Not really.
A friend recently sent me a short article about Scott-Heron which led me to actually listen to his performance of the poem for the first time in years.
“The Revolution Will Not Be Televised” is not about the technology, but about content. It was about what was on television in the 1960s and 1970s as the Civil Rights movement was getting underway. It contrasts the commodified worlds of desire, and the pablum of television shows–including supposedly “ground breaking” shows like Julia–with the idea of struggle and sacrifice.
In other words, the revolution is not a commercially-sponsored TV show you can switch on and off for your viewing pleasure. You have to live the revolution.
That’s not the message many of us are using Scott-Heron’s phrase to convey when we write about the Egyptian Revolution.
Catchphrase and Revolution
The idea of a catchphrase is that it arrests your attention, and is extremely memorable, while capturing some essential message of the discourse of which it is a part. Commercials have catch phrases, and do do poems.
Revolutions often get their catch phrases from poetry and protest songs.
And these catch phrases continue to do work in their original meaning. The boy in Ferguson who shouted “the revolution will not be televised” was, through this phrase, linking Ferguson to the larger Civil Rights movement.