CONNECTED in CAIRO

Cartoon by Darkow, Columbia (Missouri) Daily Tribune 22 Feb. 2011.

A lot of the comments I hear about Egypt’s uprisings from neighbors and acquaintances are negative. One acquaintance, a blue collar worker, said of Egypt “all I see over there is chaos.” Even those who believe that the uprisings in Egypt and elsewhere represent real efforts at democratizing aren’t happy about it. Either they believe that the Middle East can’t “do” Democracy for various reasons, or they argue that any democracy will be taken over by Islamists, turning these countries into clones of Iran. Still others argue that democracy in the Middle East isn’t in US interests.

So it was with great pleasure I read the report that a poll shows that most Americans see democratization of the Middle East as positive for the US.

Asked, “if the countries of the Middle East become more democratic,” how this would be for United States “over the next few years,” 65% say it would be mostly positive, while 31% say it would be mostly negative. Asked about “the long run,” an even larger number–76%–say democratization would be mostly positive for the US.

Even better, a majority of 57% say that they “would want to see a country become more democratic even if this resulted in the country being more likely to oppose US policies.” This number is up from five years ago, when only 48% said yes.

I blame much of the negative response I get from my neighbors on politics. I live in a crimson county in a purple state–Ohio is a swing state that voted for Obama in 2008 but gave George Bush his second term in 2004. John Boehner is my district’s congressional representative, and except for an occasional judge, you can’t get a Democrat elected dog catcher in my county.

This isn’t to knock Republicans per se–I’m a “pox on both their houses” type myself–but there seems to me no question that my Republican friends and neighbors seek out, accept, and circulate negative/pessimistic perspectives on the Middle East to a greater extent than my Democratic colleagues and friends.

The poll findings would seem to bear this out. Fifty-one percent of Americans say they think it is likely that the changes occurring in the Arab world will lead to more democracy, but 47% are more doubtful. This divides sharply along partisan lines with two out of three Republicans pessimistic, two out of three Democrats optimistic, and independents leaning to the optimistic side.

Similarly, 59% overall, and 68% of Democrats and 59% of independents, think that it is possible for Muslim and Western cultures to find common ground, while 52% of Republicans say that violent conflict is inevitable.

Other findings include:

Trend line questions show signs of modest improvement in American attitudes toward Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Majorities express favorable views of the Arab people in general (56%) the Saudi people (57%) and especially the Egyptian people (70%)–putting the Egyptian people nearly on a par with the Israeli people (73% favorable).

Significant minorities said that the Arab uprisings increased their sympathy for the Arab people (39%), and their sense of how similar the aspirations of the Arab world are to theirs (33%). Only very small minorities said that it decreased these feelings and perceptions.

“There is evidence that the Arab uprisings have contributed to improving views of Arab countries and quite positive views of the Arab people, especially Egyptians,” comments Shibley Telhami of the Anwar Sadat Chair and the Saban Center of the Brookings Institution.

Nonetheless, when asked how the United States should position itself relative to the demonstrators and the governments, two thirds say that it should not take a position in Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, Saudi Arabia or Jordan. Among those who favor the US taking a position, though, they overwhelmingly favor the US supporting the demonstrators.

The poll size is small: only 802 Americans. But it is selective, with participants chosen by a random selection of telephone numbers and residential addresses, then invited by telephone or by mail to participate in a web-based survey. Participants who don’t  have Internet access are provided with a laptop and ISP connection.

Full Disclosure

I should mention that I know both the guys whose institutions sponsored this poll and released its results at last week at the seventh Forum on US-Islamic World Relations in Washington DC.

Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at University of Maryland, was a public policy adviser on the Middle East for Republican administrations (tail end of Reagan, Bush Sr., beginning of Bush Jr.) until he broke with them because he disagreed that the Iraq war was in the US national interest. His book The Stakes outlined his positions on what should guide US policy. He spoke at Miami a few years ago, and visited my capstone class on Issues in the Middle East.

Steven Kull, director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland would definitely not remember me, but I interviewed him in my earlier life as a reporter when his book Minds at War: Nuclear Reality and the Inner Conflict of Defense Policymakers was released. I was not impressed particularly by the book (although my close reading of it helped me get a graduate TA-ship in a nuclear policy course at Brown one semester a couple of years later) but I was very interested in his interviewing technique, in which he confronted policy makers with contradictions in their interviews which led them to ever deeper levels of analysis of their own positions.

You can read the questionnaire here.

You can read the full report here.

You can read information on how the poll was conducted here.

Did anyone see the revolution coming? Apparently not. I’ve blogged twice already (here and here) about the failure of social scientists like myself to see this coming, and the failure of the protesters to realize, initially, what they were accomplishing. Now, in a recent interview with Cairo Review, former National Democratic Party Secretary General Hossam Badrawi explains why the regime didn’t see it coming–and what it looked like from inside the power structure.

Watch too, Badrawi as a speaker. He presents himself as thoughtful, self-assured but not arrogant, with Egypt’s best interests genuinely at heart. Men like this (and they are almost all men) are one reason why the NDP, in spite of the Mubarak legacy, still has a strong chance to play a dominant role in the political future of Egypt.

Badrawi was a member of the NDP for 11 years, during which he positioned himself as working for reform from within. He was named by Mubarak to head the new government after the president dismissed the previous one. He held that role for four days, then resigned from the post, and the party. But he is still being courted by his old NDP cronies, and by other, emerging parties, so we’ll no doubt see more of him.

Here’s the entire transcribed interview:

CAIRO REVIEW: What happened in Egypt?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: It’s a revolution. It changed the status of Egypt and it will definitely affect the future. Unexpectedly, it is the middle-class, educated people that made the change. Other sectors of the society have joined in. Some sectors are benefiting more. But the major move of the people: it is much more effective than in the revolution of 1919. And definitely more credible than 1952, because it’s from the people, not the army. Egypt is making history for the Middle East.

CAIRO REVIEW: Looking at it from the inside, did you see it coming?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I didn’t see it coming in that way. But the ceiling of my expectations was much less than what happened. In 1990, we were many people working for reform in Egypt from outside the government. The structure that had all of us was the New Civic Forum, led by Dr. Said El-Naggar. Some of us decided we can make the change from inside. I represented that group. Others decided to make the change as opposition. Some others stayed independent. But there is a network between us. Because we are looking for liberal thinking. We were all for a free economy, democracy, human rights. We decided to play different roles from different positions. And, I used to tell my friends, the most difficult position is mine. It is easy to be an opposition from outside. It’s much more difficult on the inside and keep your credibility by saying what you want to say. And bear in mind the fact that you’re not implementing what you want.

CAIRO REVIEW: What did you think would happen?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I thought by accumulated pressure, we could change Article 77 [in the constitution] and have limitations on the president’s terms, and change Article 76 for the way the elections can be done. And at the same time, remove the emergency [law] situation. And make the changes that implement human rights issues in the right structure. There’s a document coming from me as a responsible person for the UPR, the Universal Political Review, of Egypt in early 2010 [and] stated all these facts. I presented it to the United Nations despite the fact that I was in the NDP, which put me in conflict with the party at the time. If Article 77 was going to change and limit the president’s term, I was going to be so happy. I thought it would be an opening for everything, for political reform. I would have been satisfied if I’d seen limitation of terms and implementation of human rights. Obviously, what happened [in the revolution] is much more than that.

CAIRO REVIEW: And you didn’t see it coming?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: No, I didn’t see it coming. I expected change, but I didn’t see it coming. Not that way. I thought with the change of the president, the whole country would be changed. I thought [President] Mubarak should have announced he wouldn’t run again. I was advocating that. I thought by just changing that, most changes would happen by default.

CAIRO REVIEW: So you didn’t see a popular protest movement coming up to effect change?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: No, I didn’t see it that way. I didn’t expect the middle-class people to come together that way and be that effective. It was a good surprise.

CAIRO REVIEW: Was that a common perception in the party, the president and others didn’t see the wave coming?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I think so. I realized on the first day, some people didn’t realize what was happening even at the time it was happening. Every response from the president was too little too late, all the time. As I was given the post to direct the NDP in those four days, I had access to him and the group around him. I didn’t have it before. I didn’t have it afterwards. But during that time, I realized that they are responding always too late and too little. They don’t evaluate the magnitude of what’s happening. My role in those four days was to open everyone’s eyes, that this reality has to be respected and that the president has to step down now. That “now” was not accepted, day after day after day.

CAIRO REVIEW: Were you able to say that personally to the president?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: Personally, yes, the first day I met him. I told him he has to respect his promises to the people by amending the constitutional term [limits] and move all his authority to his vice president. I thought this is going to be more constitutional and that has to be done in the way people believe it. So he has to be clear about that, that he is not going to practice his presidency, except for one issue: to call for the referendum on the constitution, and that people should see and believe that is happening and it should be real. The delivery of his speeches did not give the impression that this was real. That was the defect. Until now I still think that moving the authority to vice president and his stepping aside from the presidency would have led the country in a more constitutional way than what is happening now.

CAIRO REVIEW: Did you mean that he resign, or hand over power?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: Hand over the power to the vice president, and to respect the constitution, so that he would have only one role, calling for the referendum. His role will be only one thing to do.

CAIRO REVIEW: But he should remain as president?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: Remain as president outside of the circle of authority. So he passes all his authority, gives it to the vice president, and moves geographically somewhere else, so he is not part of making decisions. And have things done constitutionally, and call for early elections once the constitution was amended. That was my opinion that I told him face to face.

CAIRO REVIEW: Did you ever just ask him to completely resign the presidency, as he did on February 11?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: No, I didn’t advise that. But every day that passed, I realized even the advice [I gave him] wouldn’t be accepted [by the revolution]. On the last day, I told him that even if you take my advice now, it can be successful only 10 or 15 percent. You’re late. People do not believe there’s an honest desire to step away and have the constitution be amended, and elections to be done as early as possible. That was the safest way the country can go, in my opinion.

CAIRO REVIEW: What was President Mubarak’s reaction to that advice? Did he deny there was a problem?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: Actually not. We had meetings more than three times. On Wednesday, I was not giving him advice. I was giving my statement as the secretary general of the ruling party, a position he assigned me to have two days before. I told him that from the meetings I had from different political parties and with the people in Tahrir—I had many people there with the young people—that my political understanding was that the problem isn’t in taking the action. The challenge is that they don’t believe that you are taking the action. It wasn’t advice. It was a request. And when the request was not met the way we agreed upon, I resigned.

CAIRO REVIEW: He disagreed with the request?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: No, he agreed. He understood it. He brought his legal people to make his statement on Wednesday. When I left, I was expecting him to give his statement on Wednesday, and he didn’t give it. So it was clear to me that somebody else had called him. On Thursday, I made another attempt, that he should give his statement. It is already coming to be late. He told me that he is going to give his statement by the end of the day. Then they waited and waited until 10 p.m. or something like that. The statement came in my opinion with the worst delivery, in spite of the fact that it has all the content. But the delivery was not believable to the people. At that level I was cut from communication. I could not be part of the decision making anymore. I waited. I tried to communicate and couldn’t. So I resigned.

CAIRO REVIEW: In the speech, he followed the advice?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: Yes, it followed my advice. But we had an agreement that the core of his speech should be that he was giving away his authority, clear cut. This was said in three seconds. If you look somewhere, you might not even have noticed. The delivery of the speech was not coinciding with the meaning. He started talking about himself and gave the impression that he is there. This was a big mistake. He gave his sharing of the grief of the young people who died. This was a request of the young people I met and I asked for. He separated between the revolutionary and the criminal acts. That was a request, that he has to give it to the people. But at the end of the day, if history looks at the core without the delivery system, then you realize he gave away his powers, and gave the order for constitutional amendments. So he’s not needed as a president anymore, only to call for the referendum. He didn’t say that, he didn’t press on that, he didn’t give the impression that this was the situation. The content was there, but the meaning and understanding was not there.

CAIRO REVIEW: He was not in denial about what was happening in Tahrir? He had already dismissed the leader of the party and even Gamal Mubarak.

HOSSAM BADRAWI: That was my request, by the way. That was my request. When he assigned me as secretary general, I said everyone has to resign. I have to have full authority to reform the party.

CAIRO REVIEW: So you think he was trying to remain part of the system, not to exit?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I think the circle around him was putting him to that situation. I had the feeling that he really wanted a constitutional path. And that he’s stepping down anyway, anytime. But again, the decision and timing is part of the formula. And I think they were not—his advisors—were not helpful to let him take the right action at right time.

CAIRO REVIEW: Why?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I’m not sure, but probably they were in denial more than him.

CAIRO REVIEW: Why did the president finally resign on the Friday?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I saw it coming. After his speech on Thursday, and what happened Thursday night and Friday, it was clear that it is the point of no return. I think he had no choice.

CAIRO REVIEW: Did the army go to him and say he had to step down?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: All theories are possible. I was cut completely after I left the president’s house on Thursday. On Thursday evening and Friday, I was like you, listening to news and seeing it on TV. I was cut. I was not connected. I tried but I couldn’t. I came on TV [and resigned]. The only way for me was to give a statement to the BBC so it becomes public. At the end of the day, the publicity is the reality.

CAIRO REVIEW: Why do you think the revolution happened?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I think the reaction of the police was one of the factors to create the movement. Because the excessive use of violence was part of the accumulation of other people to come in. At one level, the fear has gone. The numbers made it possible for the fear of the security forces to go away. Everybody underestimated the capacity of the youth to represent their opinion. There was underestimation of that capacity by the whole society, even by their parents, who joined them later.

CAIRO REVIEW: What led to January 25?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: It was the accumulation. I think it’s the human integrity and the human rights, more than anything else. It was not those who do not have employment. It was people with good employment in the streets. I think it was humiliation. I call it chronic anger, a chronic state of anger. In medicine, the chronic situation, you get adapted to the pain until it becomes acute. The acute exacerbation made all chronic anger come up. Part of it, was in my opinion, the way the state was dealing with the people, humiliating them in everyday activities. The relationship of the individuals with the police. They way you get your services from the state, from the cabinet, from the public officials. Everything had to do with whether you have a wasta (connections) or pay a bribe. Everybody was telling their kids, “If a policeman stops you, don’t argue.” These situations were elevating the dissatisfaction and anger. Not acute enough to revolt, but it’s there. Trigged by something, everybody came together.

CAIRO REVIEW: What was the trigger?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: The excessive use of violence within the police. Khaled Said [a young Egyptian killed in police custody in Alexandria in 2010] was part of it. And the excessive use of violence in Tahrir on the first day. On the first day everyone was calling for freedom and justice. It was not about food or unemployment. That was a collective request of everyone. As they got larger and larger, the line of fear has gone. And then with the late response, and the little response, objectives went higher. If on January 25 the president had come out to the people and said, “I’m dissolving the government and not running [for re-election],” probably everyone was going to be happy. As you go day after day, and people get hurt and die, and you are not seeing the leader of the country coming to talk to the people for three days, this was cumulative bad management of the crisis. It made the chronic stage into an acute stage.

CAIRO REVIEW: Was the “succession issue” a factor? The 2010 parliamentary elections? The Gamal Mubarak question?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I add it as a factor to the chronic anger. There were no clear-cut announcements [about Gamal Mubarak] that people could protest against. But it created the feeling that something weird was being cooked. The president should come clearly and say that he wasn’t going to run, and that no one from his family was going to run, to give that kind of satisfaction. The parliamentary election in 2010 was another important factor. In a meeting after the election, in the party they were announcing we had the largest victory any party had. I raised my hand and said, from a limited party point of view, it might be true. But from a political point of view, I think this is the largest defeat we’ve had. Because if you do not have opposition in the parliament, you will have them in the streets. And if it was in my hand, I would definitely have worked harder for the opposition to have them represented in the parliament. And I had that conflict with the administration, because I was sure that playing alone is not in the benefit of the country. And having the parliament unilaterally ruled was not going to be accepted by anyone. In spite of the fact that they had so many proofs that they won fair and square against the Muslim Brotherhood. It was a disaster and added to the chronic anger.

CAIRO REVIEW: What was your assumption about Gamal Mubarak’s intentions?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I was there for eight years, and this was never discussed between me and him, never raised as an issue in the party. But actions give different impressions. I don’t know if there was a smaller circle talking about that and I wasn’t a part of it. His presence and his leading of the party and his appearances and visits to different areas of the country, gave the impression that he’s politically portraying himself. He never talked about this with me, maybe with others. I once told him in the party, that the relationship of the party with the government is not [correct], because if it weas [correct], it should not depend on the president or the son of the president. It should depend on the dynamics of politicians. There was so much implementation of policies that we worked out that was not done. And I cannot make any difference. It is always going back to the president, whether he gives instructions to the government or not. It is all a relationship between the government and the president’s house.

CAIRO REVIEW: The NDP is not a real party?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: It was a real party, but very centralized. There were very good people. Excellent policy papers were done with lots of efforts from intellectuals and politicians, learning from the experiences of other countries. But that stops here. Whether that was being taken seriously by the government was something else.

CAIRO REVIEW: In the upper levels of the NDP, was it your assumption that Gamal was being prepared to become president?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: Yes. It was an assumption, yes.

CAIRO REVIEW: Was this ever an issue to raise that this was not a good idea, and could damage the president and the country?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: Yes. But sometimes when you say that to the person, he says “No, I’m not intending,” then the discussion becomes “Who said I want to do that?” And the president says “My son is just helping me.” The discussion stops.

CAIRO REVIEW: What was going through your mind when you saw the NDP headquarters being burned?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: Actually, I wasn’t only looking at the NDP being burned, but all police stations being burned down across the country. And all prisons being opened for prisoners to go away. And the NDP locations in eleven governorates being burned, and synchronized in the same way: we get in, steal contents, burn papers, get the hard disks of the computers. I don’t think this was the revolution in Tahrir. It was much more organized than that. You have to think that there is a mastermind. I cannot assume [who is responsible] because I don’t have any evidence. Don’t tell me people who in the streets going for their dignity and freedom organized that. It cannot be. We have to see who is going to benefit. The story did not come to the final chapter. So let’s see who will take power, and then we’ll know who’s the beneficiary.

CAIRO REVIEW: What happens next?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I want a transition to take place in a secular, civil structure. However, if the parliamentary elections are being held early, I think Egypt won’t come to a stable situation for a long time. If we do not give time for parties coming out of the revolution to establish themselves and be a part of the coming elections, we’re not giving them equal opportunity with others who are already structured and ready for those elections. The army has played a neutral role. I think they’re overwhelmed with responsibility they are not trained to do. And I believe they would like to pass authority as fast as possible. But I hope “as fast as possible” doesn’t affect the right decision. We have fragmentation now. We need one-and-a-half to two years.

CAIRO REVIEW: Would the Muslim Brotherhood win the election?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: They would be the only party inside the parliament. The NDP isn’t there. So other members would be individuals, independents running without a cover.

CAIRO REVIEW: Is the NDP finished?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: No, I don’t think so, but I think it needs years to recover with new branding. It used to depend on being a part of the ruling structure, so it lost its magnet for people who want to become part of the government. But it is still the only structure that exists other than the Brotherhood. The NDP will need three or four or five years of working hard to change the image. There’s a very negative impression. You have to rebrand.

CAIRO REVIEW: Is the political role of the Mubaraks in Egypt now over?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: Yes, it is.

CAIRO REVIEW: Does Gamal Muarak have any chance to be part of the rebirth of the NDP?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: No. I don’t think he has any role in the future.

CAIRO REVIEW: What are your plans?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I’m just listening to people, analyzing, and giving my fair opinion. I meet with all political sectors. And I think in the turbulence that exists, people have to wait and see. If there is a party that can come from down up, I’ll join.

CAIRO REVIEW: How has Egypt fundamentally changed?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: There is great opportunity for Egypt to move forward politically. It will affect the economy. I’m an optimistic person by nature. I see the opportunity there. But there are huge risks. If we fall into linear thinking that does not accept differences of opinion—either a military or a conservative religious one—neither would be best for the country.

CAIRO REVIEW: There’s a risk the military might take control completely?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I don’t know. They are there now.

CAIRO REVIEW: You’re worried about the Brotherhood?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: My intellectual structure is to be an open person, respect diversity, and accept differences in opinion. I have nothing against a woman president, or a Coptic Egyptian president, so long as it’s through a democratic process. I definitely would like to see citizenship rights regardless of any religious belief. I see that that path might not be the path of the Muslim Brotherhood for the time being. Yet, they have good things to offer. This is the only thing that makes me worry. I have so many friends in the Muslim Brotherhood, good people and excellent people. They have good intentions. They should be part of the political scene, but they shouldn’t impose their style on me.

CAIRO REVIEW: Should the future system hold the former regime accountable?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: That worries me very much, the fact that everything is being taken now by impressions. The rule of law should be the rule of law. We cannot accuse any person and accuse and incriminate and judge at the same time. That’s very scary. I’m afraid of a sort of McCarthyite attitude, that once you’re different in opinion, you’ll be taken hostage by the fact you’re different. As if we are moving from one kind of dictatorship to another kind of dictatorship.

Steve Inskeep of National Public Radio in the US spoke with Mazen Nahawi, president of News Group International, a Dubai-based news management company that monitors and analyzes traditional and social media around the Middle East and North Africa.

 

INSKEEP: You report here that people were united and optimistic and now they’re not united and not so optimistic.

Mr. NAHAWI: That’s right. We’re finding increasing levels of disenchantment. People are starting to lose faith in the end game of the revolution. The level of optimism was perhaps a little bit too high with the euphoria of the ousting of the former regime, and things are probably starting to settle down. But conversation about activism has in fact not declined.

The idea of this is more fascinating than the interview itself, which fails to grapple with many of the most interesting questions. If they are truly able to track thousands of tweets and blog posts, how are they doing it? Are they just sampling or are they using some kind of algorithm that pulls out key words? If the former, how many do they pull from how large a sample? And if the latter, how are they handling the differences between Arabic script, English transliterations and English transliteration that uses numbers to represent Arabic phonemes that don’t occur in English?

I’m more interested in the functions of social media in the uprisings than in the content, but this seems an interesting project nonetheless. In spite of its shortcomings, the NPR story is brief and worth hearing, or reading. You can do either right here.

Warning! Don't pontificate about the revolution in Egypt until you've read this blog...

The popular English language blog “Rantings of a Sandmonkey” has another rant well worth reading: Seven Popular Myths About the Revolution.

Inspired by his frustration with by all the “’experts’–foreign and domestic–pontificating really superficial analysis about something they can neither understand nor grasp”, Sandmonkey has offered the following seven propositions as myths.

1. The Army is co-opting the revolution and trying to establish another military dictatorship
2. The NDP (and Mubarak) is still controlling the country
3. The Islamists are hijacking the revolution
4. New Parties are the only way to save the next elections
5. Amr Moussa or El-Baradei is certain to be the next president
6. International forces will destroy the revolution
7. There is doom and gloom everywhere in Egypt!

So if you hear pundits spouting one of these propositions as a balanced analysis, make sure you read Sandmonkey’s rebuttal before accepting their expertise.